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Abstract—We consider the min-cost multicast problem (under
network coding) with multiple correlated sources where each
terminal wants to losslessly reconstruct all the sources. This
can be considered as the network generalization of the classical
distributed source coding (Slepian-Wolf) problem. We study the
inefﬁciency brought forth by the selﬁsh behavior of the terminals
in this scenario by modeling it as a noncooperative game among
the terminals. The solution concept that we adopt for this game
is the popular local Nash equilibrium (Waldrop equilibrium)
adapted for the scenario with multiple sources. The degradation
in performance due to the lack of regulation is measured by the
Price of Anarchy (POA), which is deﬁned as the ratio between the
cost of the worst possible Waldrop equilibrium and the socially
optimum cost. Our main result is that in contrast with the case
of independent sources, the presence of source correlations can
signiﬁcantly increase the price of anarchy. Towards establishing
this result we make several contributions. We characterize the
socially optimal ﬂow and rate allocation in terms of four intuitive
conditions. This result is a key technical contribution of this paper
and is of independent interest as well. Next, we show that the
Waldrop equilibrium is a socially optimal solution for a different
set of (related) cost functions. Using this, we construct explicit
examples that demonstrate that the POA > 1 and determine near-
tight upper bounds on the POA as well. The main techniques
in our analysis are Lagrangian duality theory and the usage
of the supermodularity of conditional entropy. Finally, all the
techniques and results in this paper will naturally extend to
a large class of network information ﬂow problems where the
Slepian-Wolf polytope is replaced by any contra-polymatroid (or
more generally polymatroid-like set), leading to a nice class of
succinct multi-player games and allow the investigation of other
practical and meaningful scenarios beyond network coding as
well.
I. INTRODUCTION
In large scale networks such as the Internet, the agents in-
volved in producing and transmitting information often exhibit
selﬁsh behavior e.g. if a packet needs to traverse the network
of various ISP’s, each ISP will behave in a greedy manner
and ensure that the packet spends the minimum time on its
network. While this minimizes the ISP’s cost it may not be the
best strategy from a overall network cost perspective. Selﬁsh
routing, that deals with the question of network performance
under a lack of regulation has been studied extensively (see
[15], [20]) and has developed as an area of intense research
activity. However, by and large most of these studies have
considered the network trafﬁc injected into the network at
various sources to be independent.
From an information theoretic perspective there is no need
to consider the sources involved in the transmission to be
independent. In this paper we initiate the study of network
optimization issues related to the transmission of correlated
sources over a network when the agents involved are selﬁsh.
In particular, we concentrate on the problem of multicasting
correlated sources over a network to different terminals, where
each terminal is interested in losslessly reconstructing all the
sources. We assume that the network is capable of network
coding. Under this scenario, a generalization of the classical
Slepian-Wolf theorem of distributed source coding [8] holds
for arbitrary networks. In particular when the network per-
forms random linear network coding each terminal can recover
the sources under appropriate conditions on the Slepian-Wolf
region and the capacity region of the terminals with respect to
the sources, thereby allowing distributed source coding over
networks. The selﬁsh agents in our set-up are the terminals
who pay for the resources. Each terminal aims to minimize
her own cost while ensuring that she can satisfy her demands.
It is important to note that this is a generalization of the
problem of minimum cost selﬁsh multicast of independent
sources considered by Bhadra et al. [3].
Our Results: In this work, we model the scenario as
a noncooperative game amongst the selﬁsh terminals who
request rates from sources and ﬂows over network paths such
that their individual cost is minimized (i.e. with no regard
for social welfare) while allowing for reconstruction of all
the sources. We investigate properties of the socially optimal
solution and deﬁne appropriate solution concepts (Nash equi-
librium and Waldrop equilibrium) for this game and investigate
properties of the ﬂow-rates at equilibrium. We brieﬂy describe
our contributions below.
i) Characterization of social-optimality conditions. The prob-
lem of computing the socially optimal cost is a convex pro-
gram. We present a precise characterization of the optimality
conditions of this convex program in terms of four intuitive
conditions, using Lagrangian duality theory and by judiciously
exploiting the super-modularity of conditional entropy.
ii) Demonstrating the equivalence of ﬂow-rates at equilibrium
with social-optimal solutions for alternative instances. We
consider certain meaningful market models that split resource
costs amongst the different terminals and show that the ﬂows
and rates under the game-theoretic equilibriums are in fact
socially optimal solutions for a different set of cost functions.
This characterization allows us to quantify the degradation
caused by the lack of regulation. The measure of performance
degradation due to such loss in regulation that we adopt isthe Price of Anarchy (POA), which is deﬁned as the ratio
between the cost of the worst possible equilibrium and the
socially optimum cost [9], [17], [21], [20].
iii) Showing that source correlation induces anarchy. The main
result of this paper is that the presence of source correlations
can signiﬁcantly increase the POA under reasonable cost-
splitting mechanisms. This is in stark contrast to the case of
multicast with independent sources, where for a large class of
cost functions, cost-splitting mechanisms can be designed that
ensure that the price of anarchy is one. We construct explicit
examples where the POA is greater than one and also obtain
an upper bound on the POA which is near tight.
Finally, we expect that the techniques developed in this
paper will be applicable to a large class of network information
ﬂow problems with correlated sources where the Slepian-
Wolf polytope is replaced by polymatroid-like objects. These
include multi-terminal source coding with high resolution [23]
and the CEO problem [18].
Background and Related Work: Distributed source
coding (or distributed compression) (see [5], Ch. 14 for an
overview) considers the problem of compressing multiple
discrete memoryless sources that are observing correlated ran-
dom variables. The landmark result of Slepian and Wolf [22]
characterizes the feasible rate region for the recovery of the
sources. However, the problem of Slepian and Wolf considers
a direct link between the sources and the terminal. More
generally one would expect that the sources communicate with
the terminal over a network. Different aspects of the Slepian-
Wolf problem over networks have been considered in ([2], [6],
[19]). Network coding (ﬁrst introduced in the seminal work of
Ahlswede et al. [1]) for correlated sources was considered by
Ho et al. [8]. They considered a network with a set of sources
and a set of terminals and showed that as long as the minimum
cuts between all non-empty subsets of sources and a particular
terminal were sufﬁciently large (essentially as long as the
Slepian-Wolf region of the sources has an intersection with the
capacity region of a given terminal), random linear network
coding over the network followed by appropriate decoding at
the terminals achieves the Slepian-Wolf bounds.
The problem of minimum cost multicast under network
coding has been addressed in the work of [13], [12]. The
multicast problem has also been examined by considering
selﬁsh agents [3], [10], [11]. Our work is closest in spirit
to the analysis of Bhadra et al. [3] that considers selﬁsh
terminals. In this scenario, for a large class of edge cost
functions, they develop a pricing mechanism for allocating
the edge costs among the different terminals and show that it
leads to a globally optimal solution to the original optimization
problem, i.e. the price of anarchy is one. Their POA analysis
is similar to that in the case of selﬁsh routing [21], [20]. Our
model is more general and our results do not generalize from
theirs in a straightforward manner. In particular, we need to
judiciously exploit several non-trivialproperties of the Slepian-
Wolf polytope in our analysis.
II. THE MODEL
Consider a directed graph G = (SUTUV,E). There is a
set of source nodes S that may be correlated and a set of
sinks T that are the terminals (i.e. receivers). Each source node
observes a discrete memoryless source Xi. The Slepian-Wolf
region of the sources is assumed to be known and is denoted
RSW. For notational simplicity, let NS = |S|,NT = |T|,
S = {1,2,...,NS}, and T = {t1,t2,...,tNT}. The set
of paths from source s to terminal t is denoted by Ps,t.
Further, deﬁne Pt = ∪s∈SPs,t i.e. the set of all possible
paths going to terminal t, and P = ∪t∈TPt, the set of all
possible paths. A ﬂow is an assignment of non-negative reals
to each path P ∈ P. The ﬂow on P is denoted fP. A rate
is a function R : S × T −→ R+, i.e. the rate requested by
the terminal t from the source s is Rs,t. We will refer to a
ﬂow and rate pair (f,R) as ﬂow-rate. Also, let us denote the
rate vector for terminal t by Rt and the vector of requested
rates at source s by ρs i.e. Rt = (R1,t,R2,t,...,RNS,t) and
ρs = (Rs,t1,Rs,t2,...,Rs,tNT ).
Associated with each edge e ∈ E is a cost ce, which takes
as argument a scalar variable ze that depends on the ﬂows to
various terminals passing through e. Similarly, let ds be the
cost function corresponding to the source s, which takes as
argument a scalar variable ys that depends on the rates that
various terminals request from s. These functions ce’s and
ds’s are assumed to be convex, positive, differentiable and
monotonically increasing. Further, the functions
  ce(x)
x dx
are also convex, positive, differentiable and monotonically
increasing. In particular, these conditions are satisﬁed by
functions like xa,a > 1 and xebx,b > 0 among others.
The network connection we are interested in supporting is
one where each terminal can reconstruct all the sources. i.e.
we need to jointly allocate rates and ﬂows for each terminal
so that it can reconstruct the sources. We now present a formal
description of the optimization problem under consideration.
Min-Cost Multicast with Multiple Sources: Let us
call the quadruple (G,c,d,RSW) an instance. The problem of
minimizing the total cost for the instance (G,c,d,RSW) can
be formulated as
minimize C(f,R) =
 
e∈E
ce(ze) +
 
s∈S
ds(ys)
subject to fP ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ P
(NIF − CP)
 
P∈Ps,t
fP ≥ Rs,t ∀s ∈ S,∀t ∈ T (1)
Rt ∈ RSW ∀t ∈ T
where ze,∀e ∈ E is a function of xe,t1,xe,t2,...,xe,tNT ,
that we shall denote ze(xe,t1,xe,t2,...,xe,tNT ) with xe,t =  
P∈Pt:e∈P fP ∀e ∈ E, ∀t ∈ T, and ys,∀s ∈ S is a
function of ρs that we will denote ys(ρs).
The formulation above is similar to the one presented in
[3]. However since we consider source correlations as well,
their formulation is a speciﬁc case of our formulation. Since
network coding allows the sharing of edges, the penalty at
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the maximum ﬂow (among the different terminals) across
the edge e. Similarly, the penalty at the sources for higher
resolution quantization is also driven by the maximum level
requested by each terminal i.e. ys is also maximum. In this
work, for differentiability requirements the maximum function
will be approximated as Lp norm with p → ∞. Nevertheless,
most of our analysis is done where ze and ys are non-
decreasing functions partially differentiable with respect to
their arguments, such that ce(ze) and ds(ys) are convex,
positive, differentiable and monotonically increasing. Note that
in the formulation above, the objective function is convex and
all constraints are linear which implies that this is a convex
optimization problem.
The constraint (1) above models the fact that the total ﬂow
from the source s to a terminal t needs to be at least Rs,t.
Finally, the rate point of each terminal Rt needs to be within
the Slepian-Wolf polytope. A ﬂow-rate (f,R) satisfying all
the conditions in the above optimization problem (i.e. (NIF-
CP) ) will be called a feasible ﬂow-rate for the instance
(G,c,d,RSW) and the cost C(f,R) will be referred to as
social cost corresponding to this ﬂow-rate. Also, we will call
a solution (f∗,R∗) of the above problem as an OPT ﬂow-rate
for the instance (G,c,d,RSW).
Consider a feasible ﬂow-rate (f,R) for the above
optimization problem. It can be seen that the value
of the ﬂow from A ⊆ S to a terminal t ∈ T is  
P∈∪s∈APs,t fP ≥
 
s∈A Rs,t. Since Rt ∈ RSW the
result of [8] shows that random linear network coding
followed by appropriate decoding at the terminals can recover
the sources with high probability. Conversely the result of [2]
shows the necessity of the existence of such a ﬂow.
Terminals’ Incentives and the Distributed Com-
pression Game: The above formulation for social cost
minimization for the instance (G,c,d,RSW) disregards the
fact that the agents who pay for the costs incurred at the
edges and the sources may not be cooperative and may have
incentives for strategic manipulation. In this work we consider
the scenario where the terminals pay for the network resources
they are being provided. The terminals are noncooperative and
will behave selﬁshly trying to minimize their own respective
costs without regard to the social cost, while ensuring that
they can reconstruct all the sources. We have the following
assumptions.
(i) Let (f,R) denote a feasible ﬂow rate for the instance
(G,c,d,RSW). The network operates via random linear net-
work coding over the subgraph of G induced by the cor-
responding {ze} for e ∈ E. The terminals are capable of
performing appropriate decoding to recover the sources.
(ii) Each terminal t ∈ T can request for any speciﬁc set of
ﬂows on the paths P ∈ Pt and rates Rt as long as such a
request allows reconstruction of the sources at t. There is a
mechanism in the network by means of which this request
is accommodated i.e. the subgraph over which random linear
network coding is performed is adjusted appropriately.
In this work we wish to characterize ﬂow-rates that represent
an equilibrium among selﬁsh terminals while they act strate-
gically to minimize their own costs. Furthermore, we shall
systematically study the loss that occurs due to the mismatch
between the social goals and terminal’s selﬁsh goals.
Towards this end, we now formally model the game orig-
inating from the selﬁsh behavior of the terminals. We model
this game as a normal formal game[16], i.e. a static one shot
strategic game of complete information, which we refer to as
Distributed Compression Game(DCG).
A normal form game, denoted (N,{Ai}i∈N,{ i}i∈N),
consists of the set of players N, the tuple of set of strategies Ai
for each player i ∈ N, and the tuple of preference relations  i
for each player i ∈ N on the set A = ×i∈NAi. For a,b ∈ A,
a  i b means that the player i prefers the tuple of strategies
a to the tuple of strategies b. In the context of Distributed
Compression Game, given an instance (G,c,d,RSW), these
parameters are deﬁned as follows.
1) The Distributed Compression Game:
Players: N = T, i.e. the terminals are the players. This is
because, as mentioned above, the terminals are the users and
they are the ones who pay for the network resources they are
being provided.
Strategies: The strategy set of a player t ∈ T consists of
tuples (ft,Rt) where
• ft is the vector of ﬂows on paths going to t, i.e. the vector
of values fP for all P ∈ Pt, and recall that Rt denotes
the rate vector for terminal t;
• fP ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ Pt,
 
P∈Ps,t fP ≥ Rs,t ∀s ∈ S and
Rt ∈ RSW.
Therefore,
At =



(ft,Rt) :
fP ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ Pt,  
P∈Ps,t fP ≥ Rs,t ∀s ∈ S,
Rt ∈ RSW



. (2)
Note that a feasible ﬂow-rate (f,R) for the instance
(G,c,d,RSW) is an element of the set A = ×t∈TAt deﬁned
for the same instance.
Preference Relations: To specify the preference relation of
terminal t ∈ T, we need to know how much does she pay
given a feasible ﬂow-rate (f,R) i.e. what fractions of the costs
at various edges and sources are being paid by t? To this end,
we need market models, i.e. mechanisms for splitting the costs
among various terminals.
Edge Costs: At a ﬂow f, the cost of an edge e ∈ E is ce(ze).
It is split among the terminals t ∈ T, each paying a fraction
of this cost. Let us say that the fraction paid by the player
t is Ψe,t(xe) i.e. the player t pays ce(ze)Ψe,t(xe) for the
edge e where xe denotes the vector (xe,t1,xe,t2,...,xe,tNT ).
Of course,
 
t∈T Ψe,t(xe) = 1 to ensure that the total cost
is borne by someone or the other. The total cost borne by t
across all the edges is
 
e∈E ce(ze)Ψe,t(xe), denoted C
(t)
E (f).
Source Costs: At a rate R, the cost for the source s is ds(ys),
which is split among the terminals t ∈ T, such that t pays
a fraction Φs,t(ρs) i.e. the player t pays ds(ys)Φs,t(ρs) for
3the source s. Of course,
 
t∈T Φs,t(ρs) = 1. Therefore, the
total cost borne by t for all sources, denoted C
(t)
S (R), is  
s∈S ds(ys)Φs,t(ρs).
Thus, with the edge-cost-splitting mechanism Ψ and the
source-cost-splitting mechanism Φ, the total cost incurred by
the player t ∈ T at ﬂow-rate (f,R) denoted C(t)(f,R) is
C
(t)(f,R) = C
(t)
E (f) + C
(t)
S (R)
=
 
e∈E
ce(ze)Ψe,t(xe) +
 
s∈S
ds(ys)Φs,t(ρs).
Now, each terminal t would like to minimize its own
cost i.e. the function C(t)(f,R) and therefore the pref-
erence relations { t} are as follows. For two ﬂow-rates
(f,R) ∈ A and ( ˜ f, ˜ R) ∈ A, (f,R)  t ( ˜ f, ˜ R) if and
only if C(t)(f,R) ≤ C(t)( ˜ f, ˜ R). Also, (f,R) ≻t ( ˜ f, ˜ R) iff
C(t)(f,R) < C(t)( ˜ f, ˜ R).
We will call (G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ) as an instance of the
Distributed Compression Game.
2) Solution Concepts for the Distributed Compression
Game: We now outline the possible solution concepts in
our scenario. These are essentially dictated by the level of
sophistication of the terminals. Sophistication refers to the
amount of information and computational resources available
to a terminal. In this work we shall work with two different
solution concepts that we now discuss.
a) Nash Equilibrium. The solution concept of Nash equlib-
rium requires the complete information setting and requires
each terminal to compute her best response to any given tuple
of strategies of the other players. For notational simplicity, let
f−t be the vector of ﬂows on paths not going to terminal t
i.e. the vector of values fP for all P ∈ P − Pt, therefore
f = (f−t,ft). Similarly, R−t is the vector of rates corre-
sponding to all players other than t, therefore R = (R−t,Rt).
In our setting, the best response problem of a terminal t
is to minimize her cost function C(t)(f−t,ft,R−t,Rt) over
(ft,Rt) ∈ At given any (f−t,R−t). Therefore a Nash ﬂow-
rate is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1: (Nash ﬂow-rate) A ﬂow-rate (f,R) feasible
for the instance (G,c,d,RSW) is at Nash equilibrium, or is a
Nash ﬂow-rate for instance (G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ), if ∀t ∈ T,
C(t)(f,R) ≤ C(t)(f−t, ˜ ft,R−t, ˜ Rt) ∀( ˜ ft, ˜ Rt) ∈ At.
We note that computing the best response will in general
require a given terminal to know ﬂow assignments on all possi-
ble paths and rate vectors for all the terminals. Moreover, con-
vexity of the objective function in NIF −CP (i.e. social cost
C(f,R)) does not imply convexity of C(t)(f−t,ft,R−t,Rt)
in the variables (ft,Rt) ∈ At in general. Therefore the
computational requirements at the terminals may be large.
Consequently Nash equilibrium does not seem to be an appro-
priate solution concept for the Distributed Compression Game
when we look through the algorithmic lens.
b) Waldrop Equilibrium. From a practical standpoint, a
terminal may only have partial knowledge of the system
and may be computationally constrained. A solution concept
more appropriate under such situations is that of local Nash
equilibrium or Waldrop equilibrium that is widely adopted in
selﬁsh routing and transportation literature[20], [14], [7]. We
note that this solution concept has also been utilized in [3]. We
ﬁrst present the precise deﬁnition of the Waldrop equilibrium
in our case and then provide an intuitive justiﬁcation. Towards
this end, we need to deﬁne the marginal cost of a path.
Deﬁnition 2: (Marginal Cost of a Path) For a P ∈ Pt its
marginal cost is CP(f) :=
 
e∈P
ce(ze)Ψe,t(xe)
xe,t .
Therefore, for the terminal t, the total cost for the edges, C
(t)
E ,
can be equivalently written as C
(t)
E (f) =
 
P∈Pt CP(f)fP.
Deﬁnition 3: (Waldrop ﬂow-rate) A ﬂow-rate (f,R) feasi-
ble for the instance (G,c,d,RSW) is at local Nash equilibrium,
or is a Waldrop ﬂow-rate for instance (G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ), if
it satisﬁes the following conditions.
(1) ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, we have
 
P∈Ps,t fP = Rs,t.
(2) ∀t ∈ T, we have
 
s∈S Rs,t = H(XS).
(3) ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, P,Q ∈ Ps,t with fP > 0, CP(f) ≤
CQ(f).
(4) For t ∈ T, let j ∈ S participates in all tight rate
inequalities involving i ∈ S (i.e. if A ⊆ S, such that
i ∈ A and
 
l∈A Rl,t = H(XA|X−A)1, then j ∈ A) and
let P ∈ Pi,t,Q ∈ Pj,t with fP > 0 then we have
CP(f) +
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂Ri,t
≤ CQ(f) +
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂Rj,t
.
Intuitively, conditions (1) and (2) require that each terminal re-
quests as little rate and ﬂow as possible. Condition (3) ensures
that an inﬁtesimally small change in ﬂow allocations from path
P (where fP > 0) to path Q where P,Q ∈ Ps,t, will increase
the sum cost along paths in Pt. Now, consider an inﬁtesimally
small change in ﬂow allocation from P ∈ Pi,t (where fP > 0)
to Q ∈ Pj,t. This also requires a corresponding change in the
rates requested from sources i and j by terminal t. Under
certain constraints on the source j, Condition (4) ensures that
the overall effect of this change will serve to increase terminal
t’s cost. The conditions on the source j are well-motivated in
light of the characterization of Nash ﬂow-rate at the end of
section III in the case when the best response problem of every
terminal is convex.
We remark that a Nash ﬂow-rate may not always be a Wal-
drop ﬂow-rate and vice versa. When sources are independent,
condition (2) implies that Rs,t = H(Xs) for all s ∈ S,t ∈ T
and it is not required to check the condition (4). Also we can
recover condition (3) by setting i = j in condition (4). They
are stated separately for the sake of clarity.
As we discussed earlier, the solution concept based on
Waldrop equilibrium seems more suitable to our scenario and
consequently we deﬁne the price of anarchy [9], [17], [20] in
terms of Waldrop ﬂow-rate instead of Nash ﬂow-rate.
Deﬁnition 4: Price of Anarchy(POA): Let C be a class of
edge cost functions, D be a class of source cost functions, G
be a class of networks/graphs, Ψ be an edge cost splitting
1We use H(XA|X−A) and H(XA|XAc) interchangeably in the text to
denote the joint entropy of the sources in set A given the remaining sources.
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M be a set of Slepian-Wolf polytopes. We will refer to
(G,C,D,Ψ,Φ,M) as a scenario. The price of anarchy for
the scenario (G,C,D,Ψ,Φ,M), denoted ρ(G,C,D,Ψ,Φ,M),
is deﬁned as
ρ(G,C,D,Ψ,Φ,M) = max
G∈G,c∈C,d∈D,RSW∈M
 
1
COPT(G,c,d,RSW)
max
(f, R) is a Waldrop ﬂow-rate for (G, c, d, RSW, Ψ, Φ)
C(f,R)
 
,
where COPT(G,c,d,RSW) refers to the optimal cost of
NIF −CP for the instance (G,c,d,RSW). Let us denote the
set of Slepian-Wolf polytopes corresponding to the case where
there are no source correlations (i.e. H(XA|X−A) = H(XA)
for all A ∈ S) by Mind (subscript ind denotes - independent)
and the set of Slepian-Wolf polytopes corresponding to the
case where sources are correlated (i.e. there exists A ⊆ S with
H(XA|X−A) < H(XA)) by Mc. Also, we use Gall to denote
the class of all graphs where every t ∈ T is connected to every
s ∈ S, and Gdsw (subscript dsw denotes - direct Slepian-Wolf)
to denote the class of complete bipartite graphs between the set
of sources and the set of terminals. Note that Gdsw corresponds
to the case where every terminals is directly connected to
every source by an edge and no network coding is required.
A question we will be most concerned with in this paper
is whether ρ(G,C,D,Ψ,Φ,Mc) > ρ(G,C,D,Ψ,Φ,Mind),
and in particular whether ρ(G,C,D,Ψ,Φ,Mc) > 1 but
ρ(G,C,D,Ψ,Φ,Mind) = 1 for meaningful classes of cost
functions C,D and reasonable splitting mechanisms Ψ and
Φ i.e. does correlation induce anarchy?
III. CHARACTERIZING THE OPTIMAL FLOWS AND RATES
In this section, we investigate the properties of an OPT ﬂow-
rate via Lagrangian duality theory [4]. Since the optimization
problem (NIF-CP) is convex and the constraints are such
that the strong duality holds, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)
conditions exactly characterize optimality [4]. Therefore, we
start out by writing the Lagrangian dual of NIF-CP,
L =
 
e∈E
ce(ze) +
 
s∈S
ds(ys) −
 
P∈P
µPfP
+
 
s∈S
 
t∈T
λs,t(Rs,t −
 
P∈Ps,t
fP)
+
 
t∈T


 
A⊆S
νA,t
 
H(XA|XAc) −
 
i∈A
Ri,t
 

where µP ≥ 0,λs,t ≥ 0 and νA,t ≥ 0 are the dual variables
(i.e. Lagrange multipliers). For notational simplicity, let us
denote the partial derivative of ze with respect to xe,t, ∂ze
∂xe,t
by z
′
e,t. Note that the partial derivative of xe,t w.r.t. to fP is 1
for a P ∈ Pt. Similarly, we denote the partial derivative of ys
with respect to Rs,t,
∂ys
∂Rs,t by y
′
s,t. The KKT conditions are
then given by the following equations that hold ∀ s ∈ S,t ∈ T,
∂L
∂fP
=
 
e∈P
c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) − µP − λs,t = 0 ∀P ∈ Ps,t, (3)
∂L
∂Rs,t
= d
′
s(ys)y
′
s,t(ρs) + λs,t −
 
A⊆S:s∈A
νA,t = 0 (4)
along with the feasibility of the ﬂow-rate (f,R) and the
complementary slackness conditions µPfP = 0 for all P ∈ P,
λs,t(Rs,t −
 
P∈Ps,t fP) = 0 for all s ∈ S,t ∈ T, and
νA,t
 
H(XA|XAc) −
 
i∈A Ri,t
 
= 0 for all A ⊆ S,t ∈ T.
Let us now interpret the KKT conditions at the OPT ﬂow-
rate (f∗,R∗). Suppose that f∗
P > 0 for P ∈ Ps,t. Then due to
complementary slackness, we have µ∗
P = 0 and consequently
from equation (3) we get
 
e∈P c
′
e(z∗
e)z
′
e,t(x∗
e) = λ∗
s,t i.e.
if there exists another path Q ∈ Ps,t such that f∗
Q > 0
then
 
e∈P c
′
e(z∗
e)z
′
e,t(x∗
e) =
 
e∈Q c
′
e(z∗
e)z
′
e,t(x∗
e). On fur-
ther investigation we can obtain four necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for optimality. Due to lack of space we will omit
the proof of the necessity of these four conditions under strict
convexity of the various cost functions and instead concentrate
on the proof of sufﬁciency of these conditions for optimality.
Theorem 5: A feasible ﬂow-rate (f,R) for the instance
(G,c,d,RSW), which satisﬁes the following four conditions is
an OPT ﬂow-rate for the instance (G,c,d,RSW). Also, there
is always an OPT ﬂow-rate that satisﬁes these four conditions.
Further, when the edge cost functions ce for all e ∈ E and the
source cost functions ds for all s ∈ S are strictly convex, that
is when the optimization problem (NIF-CP) is strictly convex,
these conditions are also necessary for optimality.
1) ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, we have
 
P∈Ps,t fP = Rs,t.
2) ∀t ∈ T, we have
 
s∈S Rs,t = H(XS).
3) ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S, P,Q ∈ Ps,t with fP > 0,  
e∈P c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) ≤
 
e∈Q c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe).
4) For t ∈ T, suppose that there exist i,j ∈ S that satisfy
the following property. If A ⊆ S, such that i ∈ A and  
l∈A Rl,t = H(XA|X−A), then j ∈ A. For such i and
j let P ∈ Pi,t,Q ∈ Pj,t with fP > 0. Then
 
e∈P
c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) + d
′
i(yi)y
′
i,t(ρi)
≤
 
e∈Q
c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) + d
′
j(yj)y
′
j,t(ρj).
Proof: We prove that the above four conditions imply
optimality of (f,R). Our assumptions guarantee that the opti-
mization problem (NIF-CP) for the instance (G,c,d,RSW) is
convexand since all the feasibility constraints are linear, strong
duality holds [4]. This implies that the KKT conditions are
necessary and sufﬁcient for optimality. We show that a feasible
ﬂow-rate (f,R) with the above four properties satisﬁes the
KKT conditions for the instance (G,c,d,RSW) for a suitable
choice of the dual variables given below.
Choosing λi,t’s: λi,t := minP∈Pi,t
 
e∈P c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe).
Note that, using Condition 3, for i ∈ S, if there exist
5a Pi ∈ Pi,t such that fPi > 0 then we have λi,t =  
e∈Pi c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe).
Choosing µP’s: For P ∈ Pi,t take µP :=  
e∈P c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) − λi,t.
Choosing νA,t’s: Let hi,t := d
′
i(yi)y
′
i,t(ρi)+λi,t. Let π denote
a permutation such that 0 ≤ hπ(1),t ≤ hπ(2),t ≤ ...hπ(NS),t.
Now take
νA,t =

  
  
hπ(1),t if A = {π(1),π(2),...,π(NS)}
hπ(i),t − hπ(i−1),t if A = {π(i),...,π(NS)}
and 2 ≤ i ≤ NS
0 otherwise.
Now, with the above choice of dual variables we will check
all the KKT conditions one by one.
Dual Feasibility:
• λi,t ≥ 0 as ce and ze are non-decreasing functions i.e.
c
′
e(ze) ≥ 0 and z
′
e,t(xe) ≥ 0.
• µP ≥ 0 by the deﬁnition because λi,t ≤  
e∈P c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) ∀P ∈ Pi,t.
• νA,t ≥ 0 by deﬁnition.
KKT Conditions as per equation 3:
∂L
∂fP
=
 
e∈P
c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) − λi,t − µP
=
 
e∈P
c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) − λi,t −
 
 
e∈P
c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) − λi,t
 
= 0
KKT Conditions as per equation 4:
∂L
∂Rπ(i),t
= d
′
π(i)(yπ(i))y
′
π(i),t(ρπ(i)) + λπ(i),t −
 
A⊆S:π(i)∈A
νA,t
= hπ(i),t −
 
A⊆S:π(i)∈A
νA,t
= hπ(i),t −
 
j∈{1,2,...,i}
ν{π(j),π(j+1),...,π(NS)},t
= hπ(i),t − [hπ(1),t + (hπ(2),t − hπ(1),t)
+ (hπ(3),t − hπ(2),t) + ··· + (hπ(i),t − hπ(i−1),t)]
= hπ(i),t − hπ(i),t = 0.
Complementary Slackness Conditions:
• µPfP = 0 for all P ∈ P. Let P ∈ Pi,t and
fP > 0 then using Condition 3 and deﬁnition of λi,t
we get
 
e∈P c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) = λi,t and therefore, µP =  
e∈P c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) − λi,t = 0.
• λs,t(Rs,t −
 
P∈Ps,t fP) = 0 for all s ∈ S,t ∈ T. This
follows from the Condition 1.
• νA,t
 
H(XA|XAc) −
 
i∈A Ri,t
 
= 0 for all A ⊆ S,t ∈ T.
Note that νA,t = 0 except for A = {π(i),π(i +
1),...,π(NS)}, for i = 1,2,...,NS. Therefore the only
condition that needs to be checked is that if
 NS
j=i Rπ(j),t >
H(Xπ(i),Xπ(i+1),...,Xπ(NS)|Xπ(i−1),...,Xπ(1)), then
hπ(i),t − hπ(i−1),t = 0.
Towards this end let j ∈ {π(i),π(i + 1),...,π(NS)}, and
let Aj be the minimum cardinality set such that j ∈ Aj and  
l∈Aj Rl,t = H(XAj|X−Aj) i.e.
Aj = arg min
A⊆S:j∈A,
 
l∈A Rl,t=H(XA|X−A)
|A|.
Such a set Aj always exists because from Condition 2 we
have
 NS
l=1 Rl,t = H(X1,...,XNS) and therefore the set  
A ⊆ S : j ∈ A,
 
l∈A Rl,t = H(XA|X−A)
 
is not empty.
We claim that there exists a j∗ ∈ {π(i),π(i +
1),...,π(NS)} such that Aj∗ ∩ {π(1),π(2),...,π(i − 1)}
is not empty. If this is not true then clearly we
have ∪
π(NS)
j=π(i)Aj = {π(i),π(i + 1),...,π(NS)} and
using the supermodularity property of conditional
entropy (ref. Lemma 10), we obtain
 π(NS)
j=π(i) Rj,t =
H(Xπ(i),Xπ(i+1),...,Xπ(NS)|Xπ(i−1),...,Xπ(1))
which is a contradiction, therefore we must have
such a j∗ ∈ {π(i),π(i + 1),...,π(NS)} such that
Aj∗ ∩ {π(1),π(2),...,π(i − 1)} is not empty.
Next, we show that there exists a source k ∈
{π(1),π(2),...,π(i − 1)} such that if j∗ ∈ A and  
l∈A Rl,t = H(XA|X−A), then k ∈ A. Towards this
end suppose that there exist subsets S1 and S2 of such
that j∗ ∈ S1 ∩ S2 and
 
l∈S1 Rl,t = H(XS1|X−S1) and  
l∈S2 Rl,t = H(XS2|X−S2), then using the supermodular-
ity property of conditional entropy we can show that rate
inequality involving S1 ∩S2 is also tight ( Lemma 10) i.e.  
l∈S1∩S2 Rl,t = H(XS1∩S2|X−(S1∩S2)). This implies that
Aj∗, being of minimum cardinality, is the intersection of all
sets that have j∗ as a member on which the rate inequality is
tight i.e.
Aj∗ =
 
A⊆S
{A : j∗ ∈ A,
 
l∈A
Rl,t = H(XA|X−A)}.
Moreover note that Aj∗ is not a singleton set since Aj∗ ∩
{π(1),π(2),...,π(i − 1)}  = φ. Therefore there exists a k ∈
Aj∗ such that k  = j∗. By our above argumentsthis implies that
if A ⊆ S is such that j∗ ∈ A and
 
l∈A Rl,t = H(XA|X−A)
then k ∈ A.
Clearly, Rj∗,t > H(Xj∗|X−j∗) as k does not participate
in this rate inequality. Therefore, Rj∗,t > 0 which implies
that there exists a P ∈ Pj∗,t with fP > 0, therefore
using Condition 3 and the deﬁnition of λj∗,t we have  
e∈P c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) = λj∗,t. Also, by the deﬁnition of λk,t
there is a Q ∈ Pk,t such that
 
e∈Q c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) = λk,t.
Now using Condition 4, we get
 
e∈P
c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) + d
′
j∗(yj∗)y
′
j∗,t(ρj∗)
≤
 
e∈Q
c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) + d
′
k(yk)y
′
k,t(ρk) ∀Q ∈ Pk,t
which implies that
λj∗,t + d
′
j∗(yj∗)y
′
j∗,t(ρj∗) ≤ λk,t + d
′
k(yk)y
′
k,t(ρk)
and therefore we get hj∗,t ≤ hk,t. Now note that k ∈
{π(1),π(2),...,π(i − 1)} while j∗ ∈ {π(i),...,π(NS)}.
This implies in turn that hπ(i),t ≤ hj∗,t ≤ hk,t. But, we know
that hk,t ≤ hπ(i−1),t i.e. hπ(i),t−hπ(i−1),t ≤ 0 but we already
have hπ(i),t−hπ(i−1),t ≥ 0 and hence hπ(i),t−hπ(i−1),t = 0.
Corollary 6: If the sources are independent (i.e. RSW ∈
Mind), there is a feasible ﬂow-rate for instance (G,c,d,RSW)
6that is an OPT ﬂow-rate for both the instances (G,c,d,RSW)
and (G,˜ c, ˜ d,RSW), where ˜ ce(x) = αce(x) for constant
α > 0, and ˜ ds is any convex, differentiable, positive and
non-decreasing function. Further, this OPT ﬂow-rate satisﬁes
the four conditions in Theorem 5 for both the instances
(G,c,d,RSW) and (G, ˜ c, ˜ d,RSW).
We omit the proof due to lack of space. The idea is that
when the sources are independent, Condition (2) in Theorem 5
implies that Rs,t = H(Xs) for all s ∈ S,t ∈ T, and therefore,
there is no pair (i,j) such that j participates in all tight rate
inequalities involving i and consequently it is not required to
check Condition (4).
We conclude this section with an important note that
whenever the best response problem of each terminal is
convex, using an approach essentially similar to the proof
of Theorem 5, it can be shown that the four conditions in
the deﬁnitions of Waldrop ﬂow-rate but with CP(f) replaced
by
∂C
(t)
E (f)
∂fP characterizes the Nash ﬂow-rate. Further, under
similar convexity conditions, we can also show that a Nash
ﬂow-rate always exists for the Distributed Compression Game.
The proofs are omitted due to space constraints.
IV. WALDROP FLOW-RATE AND THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section, we investigate the inefﬁciency brought forth
by the selﬁsh behavior of terminals. First, we will show that
the Waldrop equilibrium is a socially optimal solution for a
different set of (related) cost functions. Using this, we will
construct explicit examples that demonstrate that the POA > 1
and determine near-tight upper bounds on the POA as well.
We start out with the characterization of Waldrop ﬂow-rate.
Theorem 7: Let ze(xe) =
  
t∈T xn
e,t
  1
n ,Ψe,t(xe) =
x
n
e,t
(
 
j∈T xn
e,j) and Φs,t(ρs) = 1
NT . A Waldrop ﬂow-rate for
(G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ) is an OPT ﬂow-rate for (G,˜ c,d,RSW),
where ˜ ce(x) = NT
  ce(x)
x dx. Further, when the edge
cost functions ce for all e ∈ E and the source cost
functions ds for all s ∈ S are strictly convex, an OPT
ﬂow-rate for (G,c,d,RSW) is also a Waldrop ﬂow-rate for
(G,ˆ c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ), where ˆ ce(x) = 1
NT xc
′
e(x).
Proof: We will show that the deﬁnition of a Waldrop ﬂow-
rate for instance (G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ) exactly corresponds to
the four conditions for the instance (G, ˜ c,d,RSW) in Theorem
5.
We have, z
′
e,t(xe) = 1
n
  
j∈T xn
e,j
  1
n−1
nx
n−1
e,t =
ze
xe,t
x
n
e,t  
j∈T xn
e,j . Therefore,
CP(f) =
 
e∈P
ce(ze)
x
n−1
e,t   
j∈T xn
e,j
 
=
 
e∈P
ce(ze)
z
′
e,t(xe)
ze
=
1
NT
 
e∈P
˜ c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe)
where the last equality follows from the fact that
˜ ce(x) = NT
  ce(x)
x dx =⇒ ˜ c
′
e(x) = NT
ce(x)
x .
Also, C
(t)
S (R) = 1
NT
 
i∈S di(yi), =⇒
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂Ri,t = 1
NT d
′
i(yi)y
′
i,t(ρi). Therefore, CP(f)+
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂Ri,t =
1
NT
  
e∈P ˜ c
′
e(ze)z
′
e,t(xe) + d
′
i(yi)y
′
i,t(ρi)
 
. The result
follows from the equivalence of conditions coming from
Deﬁnition 3 and Theorem 5.
In contrast with the result of [3] that holds for a single
source with the edge cost splitting mechanism used above,
from Theorem 7, we can note that for most reasonable cost
splitting mechanisms, the POA will not equal one for all
monomial edge cost functions. We construct explicit examples
for POA > 1 in the Figure 1. The example in Figure 1(a) is
near tight as will be evident from an upper bound on POA
derived in Theorem 9.
It is interesting to note that in the case when sources
are independent, in the Waldrop or OPT solutions, the rates
requested at various sources will equal their respective lower
bounds (i.e. their entropy). Therefore, the cost term corre-
sponding to the sources will be ﬁxed, and one only needs
to ﬁnd ﬂows that minimize the edge costs. In this situation, it
is not hard to see that the POA will again equal one for all
monomial edge cost functions. i.e. it is the correlation among
the sources that is responsible for bringing more anarchy. We
formalize this below.
Let Ck = {c : ce(x) = aexk, ae > 0,∀e ∈ E} be
the set of edge cost functions where all edge cost functions
are monomial of the same degree k possibly with different
coefﬁcients, and Cmon = ∪k≥1Ck. Similarly, Dk = {d :
di(y) = bixk, bi > 0,∀s ∈ S}. Also, let Dconvex = {d :
di is convex ∀i ∈ S}.
Corollary 8: Correlation Induces Anarchy: Let ze(xe) =
  
t∈T xn
e,t
  1
n, Ψe,t(xe) =
x
n
e,t
(
 
j∈T xn
e,j), ys(ρs) =
  
t∈T Rm
s,t
  1
m, and Φs,t(ρs) = 1
NT , then we have
1) ρ(Gall,Cmon,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mind) = 1.
2) ρ(Gall,CNT,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mc) = 1.
3) ρ(Gall,Cmon,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mc) > 1 for large values
of m and n. In fact, ρ(Gall,C1,D2,Ψ,Φ,Mc) >
1+NT
5 .
4) ρ(Gdsw,Cmon,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mc) > 1 for large values
of m and n.
Proof: Let c ∈ Cmon i.e. ce(x) = aexk for ae > 0
for all e ∈ E, therefore,
  ce(x)
x dx =
 
aexk−1 dx =
ae
1
kxk = 1
kce(x). Also, d ∈ Dconvex. Now, since the
sources are independent (i.e. RSW ∈ Mind), from The-
orem 7 and Corollary 6 it follows that a Waldrop ﬂow-
rate for instance (G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ) is also an OPT ﬂow-
rate for the instance (G,c,d,RSW) which implies that
ρ(Gall,Cmon,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mind) = 1.
Even if the sources are correlated, when we have k = NT,
we have NT
  ce(x)
x dx = ce(x) and using Theorem 7, a
Waldrop ﬂow-rate for instance (G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ) is also an
OPT ﬂow-rate for the instance (G,c,d,RSW) which implies
that ρ(Gall,CNT,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mc) = 1.
We prove ρ(Gall,C1,D2,Ψ,Φ,Mc) > 1+NT
5 and conse-
quently ρ(Gall,Cmon,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mc) > 1, by explicitly
constructing an example as provided in Figure 1(a). All
sources are identical with entropy h, therefore, RSW ∈ Mc.
7Further, ds(y) = C1y2 for all s ∈ S, therefore, d ∈ D2. All
edge cost functions are ce(x) = x except for the edge (u,v)
for which ce(x) = C2 x. Therefore, c ∈ C1. Let us consider
the following ﬂow-rate (f,R)
R1,t = h ∀t ∈ T, Rs,t = 0 ∀s ∈ S − {1},t ∈ T
f(1,t) = h ∀t ∈ T,fP = 0 ∀P ∈ Pt − {(1,t)},t ∈ T.
Clearly, (f,R) is feasible for the instance (G,c,d,RSW).
We claim that (f,R) is a Waldrop ﬂow-rate for the instance
(G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ) when 2C1h
NT ≤ 1 + C2. To see this, ﬁrst
note that (f,R) satisﬁes the Conditions (1) and (2) in the
deﬁnition of Waldrop ﬂow-rate (Deﬁnition 3) for the instance
(G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ). To check the conditions (3) and (4) in
the deﬁnition, we compute the marginal cost for the various
paths and the differential cost for various sources. Note that
Ψe,t(xe) = 1
NT whenever xe,t = x for all t ∈ T for some
x > 0 and by continuity this is true even if x = 0. Therefore,
C(1,t)(f) =
 
e∈{(1,t)}
ce(ze)Ψe,t(xe)
xe,t
=
h . 1
h
= 1,
C(1,u,v,t)(f) =
 
e∈{(1,u),(u,v),(v,t)}
ce(ze)Ψe,t(xe)
xe,t
= lim
x− →0
 
x . (1/NT)
x
+
C2x . (1/NT)
x
+
x . 1
x
 
= 1 +
1 + C2
NT
,
C(s,u,v,t)(f) = 1 +
1 + C2
NT
, s ∈ S − {1}.
Clearly, the condition (3) is satisﬁed as C(1,t)(f) <
C(1,u,v,t)(f). Also,
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂Ri,t
=
1
NT
d
′
i(yi)y
′
i,t(ρi) =
1
NT
2C1yiy
′
i,t(ρi)
=
2C1
NT
y
2
i
R
m−1
i,t  
j∈T Rm
i,j
=
2C1
NT
 
 
j∈T
R
m
i,j
 2/m
R
m−1
i,t  
j∈T Rm
i,j
.
∴
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂R1,t
=
2C1
NT
(NTh
m)
2/m h
m−1
NThm =
2C1h
N2
T
as m → ∞, and
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂Rs,t
≥ 0,∀s ∈ S − {1}.
Therefore, when 2C1h
NT ≤ 1 + C2, we get C(1,t)(f) +
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂R1,t ≤ C(s,u,v,t)(f) +
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂Rs,t for all s ∈ S −
{1} which implies that the condition (4) is also satisﬁed.
Thus, (f,R) is indeed a Waldrop ﬂow-rate for the instance
(G,c,d,RSW,Ψ,Φ). Further after simple calculation we get,
C(f,R) = NTh + C1h2, as m → ∞. Now let us consider
another ﬂow-rate (f∗,R∗)
R
∗
s,t =
h
NS
∀s ∈ S,t ∈ T
f
∗
(1,t) = 0 ∀t ∈ T,and f
∗
(s,u,v,t) =
h
NS
∀s ∈ S,t ∈ T.
u v
1
2
NS -1
NS
t1
t1
tNT - 1
t
N{T}
(a)
1
2
t1
t2
(b)
Fig. 1. (a) Example of a network where POA is linear in NT. (b) Classical
Slepian-Wolf network with appropriate costs also has POA > 1.
Clearly, (f∗,R∗) is feasible for the instance (G,c,d,RSW).
Further, we get C(f
∗,R
∗) = h(1 + C2 + NT) +
C1h2
NS as m →
∞,n → ∞.
Thus, when 1+C2
C1 < h (1 − 1
NS), we have C(f∗,R∗) <
C(f,R). As OPT(G,c,d,RSW) ≤ C(f∗,R∗), this im-
plies that the POA is greater than one. In particular,
ρ(Gall,C1,D2,Ψ,Φ,Mc) >
C1+
NT
h
1+C2+NT
h +
C1
NS
. Now, take h =
1,NS = NT > 4,1 + C2 = 3NT,C1 = N2
T, and note
that 2C1h
NT = 2NT < 3NT = 1 + C2, as well as, 1+C2
C1 =
3
NT < (1 − 1
NT ) = (1 − 1
NS) as NT > 4. Therefore, we get
ρ(Gall,C1,D2,Ψ,Φ,Mc) > 1+NT
5 . This is near tight as evi-
dent from Theorem 9. To establish (4), we will prove a stronger
result, ρ(Gdsw,C3,D3,Ψ,Φ,Mc) > 1, by constructing an
example as described below. As shown in Figure 1(b) there are
two sources and two terminals which are directly connected
to each source. Both sources are identical with entropy 1,
d1(y) = C1y3,d2(y) = C2y3 with C1,C2 > 0,C1  = C2
and ce(x) = x3 for all edges. We now outline the argument
that shows that the POA > 1.
First, observe that the instance is symmetric with respect to
terminals and all cost functions are strictly convex. Therefore
the OPT ﬂow rate for the instance, denoted (f∗,R∗) is such
that R∗
s,t1 = R∗
s,t2 for s = 1,2. Next, by the characterization
of Waldrop as per Theorem 7, the Waldrop ﬂow-rate, denoted
(f,R) is an OPT ﬂow-rate for ˜ ce(x) = 2
3x3 with the source
cost functions remaining the same. This new instance with
˜ ce(x) = 2
3x3 is also symmetric with respect to the terminals
and the cost functions remain strictly convex. Therefore we
conclude that for the Waldrop ﬂow-rate as well Rs,t1 = Rs,t2
for s = 1,2. Let R1,t1 = R1,t2 = h and R∗
1,t1 = R∗
1,t2 = h∗.
Using the properties of Waldrop ﬂow-rate and OPT ﬂow rate
as per Condition (2) in Theorem 5, we have R2,t1 = R2,t2 =
1 − h and R∗
2,t1 = R∗
1,t2 = 1 − h∗. We argue below that
h  = h∗. Consequently, by uniqueness of the OPT ﬂow-rate
(due to strict convexity of the objective function) we will have
C(f,R) > C(f∗,R∗) implying ρ(Gdsw,C3,D3,Ψ,Φ,Mc) >
1. We have, for t = t1,t2,
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂R1,t = 1
NT d
′
1(y1)y
′
1,t(ρ1) =
3
2C1y2
1y1
R
m−1
1,t   2
j=1 Rm
1,j
= 3
4C1h2 as m → ∞.
Similarly,
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂R2,t = 3
4C2(1 − h)2. By the deﬁnition of
Waldrop ﬂow-rate, we have f(1,t) = h,f(2,t) = (1−h). Thus,
8C(1,t)(f) = h2,C(2,t)(f) = (1 − h)2. Further,
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂R1,t +
C(1,t)(f) =
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂R2,t + C(2,t)(f) implies that 3
4C1h2 + h2 =
3
4C2(1 − h)2 + (1 − h)2. Therefore, h
1−h =
 
3
4C2+1
3
4C1+1. Now,
from Theorem 7, (f∗,R∗) is a Waldrop ﬂow-rate for the
instance where everything remains the same except for the
edge cost functions which are now 3
2x3 instead of x3 and per-
forming the similar calculations as above for (f,R), we obtain
h
∗
1−h∗ =
 
3
4C2+ 3
2
3
4C1+ 3
2
. Clearly, since C1  = C2, we get h  = h∗.
In particular, take C1 = 4,C2 = 8, then h = 0.5695 and
h∗ = 0.5635. Thus, C(f,R) = 1.9061,C(f∗,R∗) = 1.9052
implying that POA ≥ 1.004 > 1, in this example.
We now state an upper bound that is nearly attained by the
example of Figure 1(a).
Theorem 9: Let ze(xe) =
  
t∈T xn
e,t
  1
n ,Ψe,t(xe) =
x
n
e,t
(
 
j∈T xn
e,j) and Φs,t(ρs) = 1
NT . Then,
ρ(Gall,Ck,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mc) ≤ max{NT
k , k
NT }.
Proof: Omitted due to lack of space.
Now we consider another splitting mechanism Φ that looks
more like the edge cost splitting mechanism Ψ. Speciﬁ-
cally, take ys(ρs) =
  
t∈T(Rs,t)m  1
m and Φi,t(ρs) =
(Ri,t)
m
 
j∈T (Rj,t)m. Arguing in a manner similar to Corollary 8(1)
(rates need to equal their corresponding entropies) we ob-
tain ρ(Gall,Cmon,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mnc) = 1. Now, we will
argue that with ys(ρs) =
  
t∈T(Rs,t)m  1
m and Φi,t(ρs) =
(Ri,t)
m
 
j∈T (Rj,t)m we have ρ(Gdsw,Cmon,Dconvex,Ψ,Φ,Mc) > 1
for large values of m and n. Let us consider the same
example as in Figure 1(b) but with the new source cost
splitting mechanism. The previously calculated OPT ﬂow-rate
for this instance (f∗,R∗) is given by R∗
1,t = f∗
(1,t) = h∗
and R∗
2,t = f∗
(2,t) = 1 − h∗. We will argue that this is not a
Waldrop ﬂow-rate and since the OPT ﬂow-rate is unique (by
strict convexity) we will obtain POA > 1. After some simple
calculations we get
∂C
(t)
S (R)
∂Ri,t
= d
′
i(yi)
yi
Ri,t
Φ
2
i,t(ρi) + m
di(yi)
Ri,t
Φi,t(ρi)(1 − Φi,t(ρi)).
Therefore,
∂C
(t)
S (R
∗)
∂R1,t = (m + 3)(NT)3/m C1
4 (h∗)2
and
∂C
(t)
S (R
∗)
∂R2,t = (m + 3)(NT)3/m C2
4 (1 − h∗)2. Also,
C(1,t)(f∗) = (h∗)2 and C(1,t)(f∗) = (1 − h∗)2. Note
that NT = 2 in this example. Now, with C1 =
4,C2 = 8, we have h∗ = 0.5635 and therefore
C(1,t)(f
∗)+
∂C
(t)
S (R∗)
∂R1,t
C(2,t)(f∗)+
∂C
(t)
S (R∗)
∂R2,t
=
(h
∗)
2+(m+3)(NT)
3/m C1
4 (h
∗)
2
(1−h∗)2+(m+3)(NT)3/m C2
4 (1−h∗)2 =
(m+3)(NT)
3/m+1
2(m+3)(NT)3/m+1
0.5635
2
(1−0.5635)2 = 1
2
0.5635
2
(1−0.5635)2 = 0.8333  = 1
as m → ∞.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 10: Let Rt ∈ RSW i.e.
 
l∈A Rl,t ≥ H(XA|X−A)
for all A ⊆ S. If S1,S2 ∈ S satisfy
 
l∈S1 Rl,t =
H(XS1|X−S1) and
 
l∈S2 Rl,t = H(XS2|X−S2) then
we have
 
l∈S1∩S2 Rl,t = H(XS1∩S2|X−(S1∩S2)) and  
l∈S1∪S2 Rl,t = H(XS1∪S2|X−(S1∪S2)).
Proof: We have,
 
l∈S1∩S2 Rl,t +
 
l∈S1∪S2 Rl,t =  
l∈S1 Rl,t +
 
l∈S2 Rl,t = H(XS1|X−S1) +
H(XS2|X−S2) ≤ H(XS1∩S2|X−(S1∩S2)) +
H(XS1∪S2|X−(S1∪S2)) where in the second step we have used
the supermodularity property of conditional entropy. Now we
are also given that
 
l∈S1∩S2 Rl,t ≥ H(XS1∩S2|X−(S1∩S2))
and
 
l∈S1∪S2 Rl,t ≥ H(XS1∪S2|X−(S1∪S2)). Therefore we
can conclude that
 
l∈S1∪S2 Rl,t ≤ H(XS1∪S2|X−(S1∪S2))
and
 
l∈S1∩S2 Rl,t ≤ H(XS1∩S2|X−(S1∩S2)) and
consequently that
 
l∈S1∪S2 Rl,t = H(XS1∪S2|X−(S1∪S2))
and
 
l∈S1∩S2 Rl,t = H(XS1∩S2|X−(S1∩S2)).
9